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1 Introduction
In a roommate market (Gale and Shapley, 1962), a ﬁnite set of agents has to be parti-
tioned into pairs (roommates) and singletons. We refer to such a partition as a matching.
Each agent has strict preferences over each of the other agents (i.e., sharing a room with
him/her) and staying alone (or relying on an outside option). Hence, a roommate market
is a simple example of hedonic coalition as well as network formation. In hedonic coali-
tion formation (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002), a set of agents has to be partitioned
and agents have preferences over coalitions (i.e., all subsets of agents). Thus, for room-
mate markets coalition formation is restricted to coalitions of at most two agents. In
network formation (Jackson and Watts, 2002), links between agents can be established
and agents have preferences over their links (or even the entire network structure). Thus,
for roommate markets network formation is restricted to at most one link per agent (and
agents have preferences over this direct link only). Moreover, a roommate market can be
interpreted as an extension of one of the most famous and simplest types of (two-sided)
matching markets, a so-called marriage market. In a marriage market, agents are either
male or female, and a man (woman) only wants to be matched to a woman (man) or to
him(her)self. This setting is equivalent to a roommate market where the set of agents
consists of two disjoint subsets and every agent in a certain subset prefers staying alone
to being matched to another agent in the same subset. Hence, roommate markets are a
particularly interesting class of matching markets because they lie in the “intersection”
of network and coalition formation models.
In all the matching, coalition, and network models mentioned above, stability is a cen-
tral property. For roommate markets, a matching is stable if all roommates are mutually
acceptable and no pair of agents would prefer to be roommates instead of having their
current matches. For marriage and roommate markets this (pairwise) stability notion is
known to be equivalent to core stability. However, when extending the class of marriage
markets to the class of roommate markets a problem occurs: while the core for a marriage
market is always non-empty, the core of a roommate market can well be empty (Gale and
Shapley, 1962). As a consequence, roommate markets can be considered an important
benchmark for the development of solution concepts for matching, network, and coalition
formation models that may exhibit an empty core or an empty set of stable matchings or
network/coalition structures.1
Solution concepts can be either categorized as myopic or farsighted. The core would
be an example of a myopic solution concept based on a direct dominance relation that
formalizes the existence of blocking pairs. Using this direct dominance relation, Ehlers
(2007) and Wako (2008) analyze von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for marriage mar-
kets.2 By adding enforceability (loosely speaking, the way a matching changes into an-
1For more general models of matching as well as coalition or network formation, various stability
notions exist and pairwise stability is no longer equivalent to core stability.
2Ehlers (2007) gives a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a set of matchings to be a von Neumann-
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other matching when blocking pairs are matched) to direct dominance, myopic dynamic
solution concepts can be considered as well. In one branch of the “dynamic literature,”
individual decisions to match with other agents (or to establish a link or join a coalition)
are myopic because agents only consider the new enforced matching (or network or coali-
tion) and ignore the fact that the new matching itself could be un-stable as well. Myopic
blocking dynamics of this kind have been introduced by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for
marriage markets and have been analyzed for couples markets by Klaus and Klijn (2007)
and for (solvable) roommate markets by Diamantoudi et al. (2004). A model of dynamic
network formation based on myopic blocking has been proposed by Jackson and Watts
(2002) and modiﬁed to roommate markets by Klaus et al. (2008).
In contrast to the myopic approach, another branch of the literature models individ-
uals as farsighted, i.e., agents do not only consider their new match but also potential
future changes. Based on the concept of indirect dominance proposed by Harsanyi (1974)
and formalized by Chwe (1994), several contributions investigate farsighted decision mak-
ing and stability in abstract social situations (e.g., Greenberg, 1990; Chwe, 1994; Xue,
1998), hedonic coalition formation (e.g., Diamantoudi and Xue, 2003), or network forma-
tion (e.g., Page et al., 2005; Herings et al., 2008; Page and Wooders, 2008). The various
solution concepts considered range from Greenberg’s (1990) conservative stable standard
of behavior as represented by the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994) to the optimistic
stable standard of behavior as represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly
stable sets. Recently, Mauleon et al. (2008) analyzed von Neumann-Morgenstern farsight-
edly stable sets for two-sided matching markets. According to Mauleon et al. (2008), for
marriage markets and many-to-one matching markets with responsive preferences, the
only von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets are the singletons that consist of
the stable matchings.
Here, we are interested in von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for room-
mate markets. First, we use the bi-choice graph technique of Klaus and Klijn (2009) to
give a simple characterization of indirect dominance (Proposition 1). Then, we show that
a singleton matching is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if
the matching is stable (Theorem 1). Moreover, a pair of matchings can never be a von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Lemma 4). However, we provide exam-
ples of roommate markets that exhibit no von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable
set (Example 1) and a non-singleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set
(Example 2), respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the roommate market
model. In Section 3, we introduce von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets.
Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 concludes.
Morgenstern stable set in a marriage market. Wako (2008) showed that each marriage market has a
unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. Other myopic solution concepts for roommate markets
include maximum stable matchings (Tan, 1990), stable partitions (Tan, 1991), almost stable matchings
(Abraham et al., 2006), p-stable matchings (In˜arra et al., 2008a), and absorbing sets (In˜arra et al., 2008b).
3
2 The Model
In a roommate market, a ﬁnite set of agents N has to be partitioned into pairs (room-
mates) and singletons. Each agent i ∈ N has preferences Ri over sharing a room with any
of the agents in N\{i} and having a room for himself (or consuming an outside option
such as living oﬀ-campus). Agents’ preferences are total orders3 over N . In particular,
for all i ∈ N , k Ri j and j Ri k if and only if j = k. The strict preference and indif-
ference relation associated with Ri are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively. If i Pi j then
j is unacceptable to i. Since the set of agents N remains ﬁxed throughout this paper,
we simply denote a roommate market (Gale and Shapley, 1962) by its preference proﬁle
R = (Ri)i∈N .
A solution to a roommate market, a matching µ, is a partition of N into pairs and
singletons. Alternatively, a matching is a function µ : N → N of order two, i.e., for all
i ∈ N , µ(µ(i)) = i. We denote the set of matchings for all roommate markets deﬁned for
the set of agents N by M. Agent µ(i) is agent i’s mate, i.e., the agent with whom he is
matched to share a room (possibly himself). For S ⊆ N , µ(S) denotes the set of mates
of agents in S, i.e., µ(S) = {µ(i) : i ∈ S}. If µ(i) = i then we call i a single. With some
abuse of notation we write µ Ri µ
′ if and only if µ(i) Ri µ′(i).
A matching µ is blocked by a pair {i, j} ⊆ N (possibly i = j) if j Pi µ(i) and i Pj µ(j).
If {i, j} blocks µ, then {i, j} is called a blocking pair for µ. A pair {i, j} ⊆ N (possibly
i = j) that is not a blocking pair for µ is called a non-blocking pair for µ.
A matching µ is blocked by a coalition S ⊆ N if there exists a matching µ′ such that
µ′(S) = S and for all i ∈ S, µ′(i)Piµ(i). If S blocks µ, then S is called a blocking coalition
for µ.
Next, we introduce the enforceability notion that we will use throughout the paper,
i.e., in the following we describe how a coalition of agents can enforce a matching µ′
starting from a matching µ. For any matching µ and any coalition S ⊆ N we say that µ′
results from µ by matching S if µ′(S) = S and for all k ∈ N \ S,
µ′(k) :=
{
k if µ(k) ∈ S,
µ(k) if µ(k) /∈ S;
i.e., coalition S is (re)matched among itself, previous mates of agents in S who are not
in S themselves become single, and all other agents have the same mates as before. We
write this as µ →S µ′. If for some pair {i, j}, µ →{i,j} µ′, then we assume, without loss of
generality, that µ′(i) = j.4 In this case we say that the (possibly non-blocking) pair {i, j}
is satisfied.
3A total order is a binary relation that satisﬁes antisymmetry, transitivity, and totality (comparability).
4The only other possibility is that i = j, µ′(i) = i, and µ′(j) = j. In that case µ′ also results from µ
by matching {i, i} or {j, j}.
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Note that if a coalition S ⊆ N blocks a matching µ, then there exists a pair {i, j} ⊆ S
(possibly i = j) that blocks µ. Furthermore, µ →S µ′ implies that there exist disjoint
pairs {i1, j1}, . . . , {iL−1, jL−1} (possibly for some l ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1}, il = jl) such that
µ = µ1 →{i1,j1} µ2 →{i2,j2} . . . →{iL−1,jL−1} µL = µ′.
A matching is individually rational if there is no blocking pair {i, j} with i = j. We
denote the set of individually rational matchings for roommate market R by I(R). A
matching is stable if there is no blocking pair. We denote the set of stable matchings for
roommate market R by S(R). A roommate market R is solvable if S(R) = ∅. Otherwise
it is called unsolvable. Note that for any roommate market the set of stable matchings
equals the core (due to the fact that the existence of any blocking coalition induces the
existence of a blocking pair as already mentioned before).
A marriage market (Gale and Shapley, 1962) is a roommate market such that N is the
union of two disjoint sets M and W (men and women), and each agent in M (respectively
W ) prefers being alone to being matched with any other agent in M (respectively W ).
An individually rational matching for a marriage market respects the partition of agents
into two types and never matches two men or two women.
Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that all marriage markets are solvable and provided
an unsolvable roommate market (Gale and Shapley, 1962, Example 3).
3 Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsighted Stability
Harsanyi (1974) criticizes stability notions based on myopic decision making; he argues
that coalitions may enforce a myopically not very attractive outcome in order to set a
chain of events in motion that in the end will lead to a preferred outcome for the coalition.
The following indirect dominance notion incorporates this insight.
Matching µ′ indirectly dominates matching µ, denoted by µ′  µ, if there exists a se-
quence of matchings µ = µ1, . . . , µL = µ
′ and a sequence of pairs {i1, j1}, . . . , {iL−1, jL−1}
such that for all l ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1}, µl →{il,jl} µl+1 and for all k ∈ {il, jl}, µ′ Pk µl.5 We
refer to such a sequence of pairs as an indirect dominance path of pairs (from µ to µ′) and
to the resulting sequence of matchings µ = µ1, . . . , µL = µ
′ as an indirect dominance path
of matchings (from µ to µ′).
Note that using coalitions instead of pairs would not change this deﬁnition as long as
µ is individually rational (since any change by a coalition can be obtained by a sequence
of disjoint pairs in this case).6 Moreover, if coalitions are used only minor changes in the
5Hence, we follow the standard myopic blocking dynamics used in various papers (e.g., Roth and
Vande Vate, 1990; Diamantoudi et al., 2004; Klaus et al., 2008) by assuming that in the sequence of
matchings from µ to µ′, any matching µl+1 results from µl by matching a pair.
6To see that there is a matching µ′ that indirectly dominates an individually irrational matching µ by
an indirect dominance path of coalitions but does not indirectly dominate µ by an indirect dominance
path of pairs, consider the following example. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and 1 P1 2 P1 4 P1 3, 1 P2 3 P2 2 P2 4,
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proofs are needed to show that all our results still hold.
A set of matchings V ⊆M is farsightedly internally stable if for all µ, µ′ ∈ V , µ′  µ.
Every set of matchings V with cardinality |V | = 1 is farsightedly internally stable.
A set of matchings V ⊆M is farsightedly externally stable if for all matchings µ /∈ V
there exists a matching µ′ ∈ V such that µ′  µ. The set of all matchings M is
farsightedly externally stable.
A set of matchings V ⊆M is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable
set if it is farsightedly internally and externally stable. Von Neumann-Morgenstern far-
sightedly stable sets represent Greenberg’s (1990) optimistic stable standard of behavior
(OSSB) based on the indirect dominance relation.
4 Results
We ﬁrst introduce the bi-choice graph technique of Klaus and Klijn (2009) to prove a useful
characterization of indirect dominance. As a by-product, the bi-choice graph technique
oﬀers a simple construction of indirect dominance paths between individually rational
matchings.
Let R be a roommate market and µ, µ′ ∈ I(R), µ = µ′, such that (a) there is no
blocking pair {i′, j′} for µ with µ′(i′) = j′ and (b) there is no blocking pair {i, j} for µ′
with µ(i) = j. We consider the following bi-choice graph G(µ, µ′) = (N,E). The set of
vertices is the set of agents N . The set of edges E consists of the following three types of
edges. Let i, j ∈ N . Then,
E1. there is a continuous directed edge from i to j, denoted by i j if j =
µ(i) Pi µ
′(i), i.e., agent i strictly prefers his match j = µ(i) under µ to his match
under µ′;
E2. there is a discontinuous directed edge from i to j, denoted by i j if j =
µ′(i) Pi µ(i), i.e., agent i strictly prefers his match j = µ′(i) under µ′ to his match
under µ;
E3. there is a (continuous) undirected edge between i and j, denoted by i j if
j = µ(i) Ii µ
′(i), i.e., agent i is indiﬀerent between his match j = µ(i) under µ and
his match under µ′. Note that for j = i = µ(i) Ii µ′(i) we allow for an undirected
edge from i to himself; we call such an edge a loop: i .
3P3 4P3 2P3 1, 3P4 1P4 4P4 2. Then, µ = [{1, 4}, {2, 3}]→N µ′ = [{1, 2}, {3, 4}] is an indirect dominance
path of coalitions from the individually irrational matching µ to µ′. On any indirect dominance path of
pairs from µ to µ′, however, agent 1 or agent 3 has to become single at some point. But both agents are
matched in an individually irrational way at µ′ – a contradiction to farsighted stability using pairs. Hence,
using coalitions in the deﬁnition of indirect dominance paths leads to strictly more indirect dominance
relations than using pairs.
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Lemma 1. Bi-choice graph components
Let R be a roommate market and µ, µ′ ∈ I(R), µ = µ′, such that (a) there is no blocking
pair {i′, j′} for µ with µ′(i′) = j′ and (b) there is no blocking pair {i, j} for µ′ with
µ(i) = j. Let i ∈ N . Then, agent i’s component of G(µ, µ′) either
(a) equals i j for some agent j (i.e., i if j = i), or
(b) is a directed even cycle, i.e., there is a directed path starting from i that induces
a closed cycle ci = (i1, i2, i3, . . . , ip) consisting of an even number p ≥ 4 of agents
(with i ∈ {i1, . . . , ip} and ir = is for all r = s) where continuous and discontinuous
edges alternate.
Klaus and Klijn (2009, Lemma 1) prove Lemma 1 for stable matchings, but explain
why the result easily generalizes to Lemma 1 as stated above (Klaus and Klijn, 2009,
Footnote 6).
Our ﬁrst result characterizes the indirect dominance relation on the domain of indi-
vidually rational matchings. Mauleon et al. (2008, Lemma 1) is a corresponding result
for marriage markets.
Proposition 1. A characterization of indirect dominance
Let R be a roommate market and µ, µ′ ∈ I(R) with µ = µ′. Then, µ′  µ if and only if
there is no blocking pair {i, j} for µ′ with µ(i) = j.
Proof.
′′ ⇒ ′′ Suppose µ′  µ and there exists a blocking pair {i, j} for µ′ with µ(i) = j.
Let {i1, j1}, . . . , {iL−1, jL−1} be an indirect dominance path of pairs from µ to µ′. Let
µ = µ1, . . . , µL = µ
′ be the corresponding indirect dominance path of matchings. Then,
since µ(i) = j and µ′(i) = j, there is a smallest index l∗ ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1} that labels the
ﬁrst time one of the two agents in {i, j} actively participates in the indirect dominance
path, i.e., l∗ ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1} is the smallest index such that {i, j} ∩ {il∗ , jl∗} = ∅. Let
k ∈ {i, j}∩ {il∗, jl∗}. By the deﬁnition of an indirect dominance path, µ′(k)Pk µl∗(k). By
the minimality of l∗, µl∗(k) = µ(k). Thus, µ′(k) Pk µ(k), in contradiction to {i, j} with
µ(i) = j and k ∈ {i, j} being a blocking pair for µ′. Hence, µ′  µ implies that there is
no blocking pair {i, j} for µ′ with µ(i) = j.
′′ ⇐ ′′ Assume that there is no blocking pair {i, j} for µ′ with µ(i) = j. We now explicitly
construct an indirect dominance path of pairs from µ to µ′ in order to show µ′  µ.
First, take any blocking pair {i, j} for µ that is matched under µ′ (if any) and match
agents i and j. Now take any blocking pair for the resulting matching that is matched
under µ′ (if any) and match the involved agents. Continue satisfying blocking pairs one
by one in this way, until we obtain a matching µ∗ such that there is no blocking pair for
µ∗ that is matched under µ′. Note that since µ ∈ I(R), all blocking pairs that are satisﬁed
in this procedure are of cardinality 2 and µ∗ ∈ I(R).
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Note that once a blocking pair is satisﬁed in the procedure it will never be unmatched
in the remainder of the procedure. So,
µ∗  µ. (1)
Hence, if µ∗ = µ′ then we are done. Suppose µ∗ = µ′. Then, µ′, µ∗ ∈ I(R), µ′ = µ∗,
and by construction of µ∗, (a) there is no blocking pair {i′, j′} for µ∗ with µ′(i′) = j′.
Suppose there is a blocking pair {i∗, j∗} for µ′ with µ∗(i∗) = j∗. Since (by assumption)
there is no blocking pair {i, j} for µ′ with µ(i) = j, µ(i∗) = j∗. Since µ∗(i∗) = j∗ and
by the construction of µ∗, then {i∗, j∗} is a blocking pair for µ that is matched under µ′;
contradicting that {i∗, j∗} is a blocking pair for µ′. Therefore, (b) there is no blocking
pair {i∗, j∗} for µ′ with µ∗(i∗) = j∗.
So, Lemma 1 applies to the bi-choice graph G(µ′, µ∗). Without loss of generality,
assume that there is exactly one directed even cycle (i1, i2, i3, . . . , ip) in G(µ
′, µ∗) (if not,
then repeat the following argument for each directed even cycle).7 This implies that
matchings µ′ and µ∗ only diﬀer in the way the agents in {i1, i2, i3, . . . , ip} are matched.
Assume, without loss of generality, that µ′(i1) = i2, i.e., there is a continuous directed
edge from i1 to i2. Then, all agents ik with k being odd, prefer their mates at µ
′ to their
mates at µ∗ and all agents il with l being even, prefer their mates at µ∗ to their mates at
µ′.
Let µ˜1 := µ
∗ and µ˜1 →{i1} µ˜2 (agent i1 un-matches from µ∗(i1) = ip). Then, at the
new matching µ˜2 agent ip is single and prefers to be matched with µ
′(ip) = ip−1. Thus,
since p − 1 is odd, {ip−1, ip} is a blocking pair for µ˜2. Let µ˜2 →{ip−1,ip} µ˜3. Then, at µ˜3
agent ip−2 is single and prefers to be matched with µ′(ip−2) = ip−3. Then, since p − 3 is
odd, {ip−3, ip−2} is a blocking pair for µ˜3. Let µ˜3 →{ip−3,ip−2} µ˜4, etc.
Since p is even, we cover the complete cycle without overlaps and obtain a sequence
of matchings µ∗ = µ˜1, . . . , µ˜ p
2
+2 = µ
′ such that for all l ∈ {2, . . . , p
2
+1}, µ˜l+1 results from
µ˜l by matching pair {ip−2l+3, ip−2l+4} and for all k ∈ {ip−2l+3, ip−2l+4}, µ′ Pk µ˜l. Also note
that for l = 1, µ′ Pi1 µ˜1 = µ˜l. Hence,
µ′  µ∗. (2)
Recall that in the construction of µ∗ out of µ once a blocking pair is satisﬁed it will
never be unmatched until we obtain µ∗. In fact, for any such blocking pair {i, j} and for
any k ∈ {i, j}, µ′(k) = µ∗(k). But then (1) and (2) imply µ′  µ, which completes the
proof.
By the following lemma, only individually rational matchings can be part of any vNM
farsightedly stable set.
Lemma 2. Individual rationality of vNM farsightedly stable sets
Let V be a vNM farsightedly stable set and µ ∈ V . Then, µ is individually rational.
7There is at least one such cycle because otherwise µ′ = µ∗; a contradiction.
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Proof. Suppose µ ∈ V is not individually rational. Then, there exists a blocking pair
{i, i} for µ. Consider µ →{i} µ′. By farsighted internal stability, µ′ /∈ V . By farsighted
external stability, there exists a µ′′ ∈ V such that µ′′  µ′. Suppose µ′′ = µ. Then,
µ  µ′. By the proof of ′′ ⇒ ′′ of Proposition 1, there is no blocking pair for µ matched
under µ′, which is in contradiction to µ →{i} µ′. Hence, µ′′ = µ.
Let {i1, j1}, . . . , {iL−1, jL−1} be an indirect dominance path of pairs from µ′ to µ′′.
Since µ′(i) = i, either µ′′(i) = i or µ′′(i)Piµ′(i). In either case, {i}, {i1, j1}, . . . , {iL−1, jL−1}
is an indirect dominance path of pairs from µ to µ′′. Hence, µ′′  µ, which is in contra-
diction to farsighted internal stability.
The next theorem extends Theorem 1 in Mauleon et al. (2008) to roommate markets.
Theorem 1. Stable matchings and vNM farsightedly stable sets
A singleton {µ} is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if µ is stable.
Proof.
′′ ⇒ ′′ Suppose {µ} is a vNM farsightedly stable set and µ is not stable. Then, there
is a blocking pair {i, j} for µ. By Lemma 2, µ ∈ I(R). Consider µ →{i,j} µ′. Note that
µ′ ∈ I(R). By Proposition 1, µ  µ′ because there exists a blocking pair {i, j} for µ with
µ′(i) = j. This contradicts farsighted external stability of {µ}.
′′ ⇐ ′′ Let µ be stable. Since any singleton is farsighted internally stable, we only have
to prove that {µ} is farsighted externally stable. Let µ′ = µ be a (possibly individually
irrational) matching. Let {i′1, . . . , i′k} be the agents that under µ′ are matched in an
individually irrational way. Consider µ′ and unmatch all agents in {i′1, . . . , i′k}. Denote
the resulting matching by µ′′.
Since µ is stable and µ′′ ∈ I(R), Proposition 1 immediately implies µ  µ′′. Let
{i1, j1}, . . . , {iL−1, jL−1} be an indirect dominance path of pairs from µ′′ to µ. Since µ
is individually rational, all agents in {i′1, . . . , i′k} will strictly prefer µ to µ′. This implies
that {i′1}, . . . , {i′k}, {i1, j1}, . . . , {iL−1, jL−1} is an indirect dominance path of pairs from
µ′ to µ. Hence, µ  µ′.
The ′′ ⇐ ′′-part is related to Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) who show that for hedonic
games with strict preferences any partition that is in the core indirectly dominates any
other partition.
While Theorem 1 implies the existence of a vNM farsightedly stable set in any solvable
roommate market (and in particular in any marriage market), the following example
presents an (unsolvable) roommate market without any vNM farsightedly stable set.
Example 1. A roommate market without a vNM farsightedly stable set
We consider the following unsolvable roommate market with three agents N = {1, 2, 3}.
Table 1 lists agents’ preferences in its columns, e.g., agent 1’s preferences are such that
2 P1 3 P1 1.
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agent 1 agent 2 agent 3
2 3 1
3 1 2
1 2 3
Table 1: Example 1 – preferences
The set of matchings equals M = I(R) = {µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3} where
µ0 = [{1}, {2}, {3}],
µ1 = [{1, 2}, {3}],
µ2 = [{1, 3}, {2}],
µ3 = [{1}, {2, 3}].
Using Proposition 1 it is readily veriﬁed that the only indirect dominance relations between
the matchings are the following: µ1  µ2  µ3  µ1, µ1  µ0, µ2  µ0, and µ3  µ0.
Suppose there exists a vNM farsightedly stable set V . Clearly, by farsighted internal
stability, |V | < 2. Thus, V = {µ} for some µ ∈ M. Since the set of stable matchings
S(R) = ∅, this contradicts Theorem 1. 
The next results give some more insights into the structure of von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets.
Lemma 3. Mutual blocking in vNM farsightedly stable sets
Let V be a vNM farsightedly stable set. For any two matchings µ1, µ2 ∈ V with µ1 = µ2
there is a blocking pair {i1, j1} for µ1 with µ2(i1) = j1 and there is a blocking pair {i2, j2}
for µ2 with µ1(i2) = j2.
Proof. Let µ1, µ2 ∈ V with µ1 = µ2. By Lemma 2, µ1, µ2 ∈ I(R). Suppose that there
is no blocking pair {i1, j1} for µ1 with µ2(i1) = j1. Then, by Proposition 1, µ1  µ2;
contradicting farsighted internal stability. Hence, there is a blocking pair {i1, j1} for µ1
with µ2(i1) = j1. The proof that there is a blocking pair {i2, j2} for µ2 with µ1(i2) = j2
is similar.
Next, we prove that no vNM farsightedly stable set can be composed of exactly two
elements.
Lemma 4. Two element vNM farsightedly stable sets do not exist
For any vNM farsightedly stable set V , |V | = 2.
Proof. Suppose V = {µ1, µ2} with µ1 = µ2. Then, by Lemma 3, there is a blocking pair
{i1, j1} for µ1 with µ2(i1) = j1 and there is a blocking pair {i2, j2} for µ2 with µ1(i2) = j2.
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Take any blocking pair {i, j} for µ2 that is matched under µ1 (note that there is at
least one such blocking pair) and match agents i and j. Now take any blocking pair
for the resulting matching that is matched under µ1 (if any) and match the involved
agents. Continue satisfying blocking pairs one by one in this way, until we obtain a
matching µ′2 such that there is no blocking pair for µ
′
2 that is matched under µ1. By
Lemma 2, µ1, µ2 ∈ I(R). Hence, all blocking pairs that are satisﬁed in this procedure are
of cardinality 2 and µ′2 ∈ I(R). By construction and Proposition 1, µ2  µ′2. Furthermore,
by construction, there are no blocking pairs {i′, j′} for µ′2 with µ2(i′) = j′. Hence, by
Proposition 1, µ′2  µ2. Thus, by farsighted internal stability, µ′2 /∈ V .
Next, by farsighted internal stability we have that µ1  µ2. Thus, by Proposition 1,
there exists a blocking pair {i, j} for µ1 with µ2(i) = j. Note that neither i nor j are
then involved in a blocking pair of µ2 that is matched under µ1. Hence, by construction
of µ′2, µ
′
2(i) = j. Thus, there exists a blocking pair {i, j} for µ1 with µ′2(i) = j and by
Proposition 1, µ1  µ′2. Since also µ2  µ′2, this is in contradiction to farsighted external
stability of V .
Lemma 4 excludes the existence of a vNM farsightedly stable set with two matchings
for roommate markets. A stronger result for the subclass of marriage markets is stated
in Mauleon et al. (2008, Theorem 2), according to which any vNM farsightedly stable
set is a singleton that consists of a stable matching. Independently from Mauleon et al.
(2008) we have established the nonexistence of vNM farsightedly stable sets with three
matchings for marriage markets. We have relegated the statement and proof of this result
to the Appendix (Lemma 5).
Our ﬁnal example shows, however, that Lemma 5 cannot be generalized to the class of
roommate markets. It presents an (unsolvable) roommate market with a vNM farsight-
edly stable set that consists of three matchings. In particular, the example shows that
roommate markets can exhibit a vNM farsightedly stable set with un-stable matchings,
which is not the case for marriage markets according to Mauleon et al. (2008, Theorem 2).
Example 2. A three element vNM farsightedly stable set
We consider an unsolvable roommate market with six agents N = {1, . . . , 6}. Table 2 lists
agents’ preferences in its columns, e.g., agent 1’s preferences are such that 2 P1 3 P1 1 · · ·
where “· · ·” represents any ordering of the remaining agents.
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agent 1 agent 2 agent 3 agent 4 agent 5 agent 6
2 3 1 6 4 5
3 1 2 5 6 4
1 2 3 4 5 6
...
...
...
...
...
...
Table 2: Example 2 – preferences
Deﬁne
µ0 = [{1}, . . . , {6}],
µ1 = [{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 5}, {6}],
µ2 = [{2, 3}, {1}, {5, 6}, {4}],
µ3 = [{1, 3}, {2}, {4, 6}, {5}],
µ4 = [{1, 2}, {3}, {5, 6}, {4}],
µ5 = [{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 6}, {5}],
µ6 = [{2, 3}, {1}, {4, 6}, {5}],
µ7 = [{2, 3}, {1}, {4, 5}, {6}],
µ8 = [{1, 3}, {2}, {4, 5}, {6}],
µ9 = [{1, 3}, {2}, {5, 6}, {4}].
Let V = {µ1, µ2, µ3}. To see that V is internally stable, consider w.l.o.g. µ1. First,
notice that {4, 5} is a blocking pair for µ2 that is matched under µ1. So, by Proposition 1,
µ2 does not indirectly dominate µ1. Second, notice that {1, 2} is a blocking pair for µ3
that is matched under µ1. So, again by Proposition 1, µ3 does not indirectly dominate
µ1. Hence, µ1 is not indirectly dominated by another matching in V . Analogously it can
be shown that µ2 and µ3 are not indirectly dominated by another matching in V . Hence,
V is internally stable.
To see that V is externally stable, consider a matching µ /∈ V (possibly individually
irrational) and construct the following sequence of matchings.
Step I: Unmatch pairs of agents that are matched in an individually irrational way and
denote the resulting matching by µ˜. If µ˜ ∈ V , we have established an indirect dominance
path from µ to a matching in V .
Step II: Suppose that µ˜ /∈ V . Note that µ˜ ∈ I(R).
Suppose µ˜ has no matched pairs. Then, µ˜ = µ0. Then, Step I and subsequently
matching {1, 2} and {4, 5} constitutes an indirect dominance path from µ to µ1. Hence,
there exists an indirect dominance path from µ to a matching in V .
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Suppose µ˜ has exactly one matched pair. By the symmetric construction of the exam-
ple, assume without loss of generality that µ˜ = [{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}]. Then, Step I
and subsequently matching {4, 5} constitutes an indirect dominance path from µ to µ1.
Hence, there exists an indirect dominance path from µ to a matching in V .
Suppose µ˜ has exactly two matched pairs. Then, for some i ∈ {4, . . . , 9}, µ˜ = µi. Let
µ˜ = µ4 = [{1, 2}, {3}, {5, 6}, {4}]. Then, Step I and subsequently matching {2, 3} consti-
tutes an indirect dominance path from µ to µ2 ∈ V . Let µ˜ = µ5 = [{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 6}, {5}].
Then, Step I and subsequently matching {2, 3, } and {5, 6} constitutes an indirect domi-
nance path from µ to µ2 ∈ V . Similarly, if for some i = 6, 7, 8, 9, µ˜ = µi, then there exists
an indirect dominance path from µ to a matching in V . We list one indirect dominance
path by means of blocking pairs for each matching µi, i ∈ {4, . . . , 9}, in Table 3. Hence,
any µ /∈ V is indirectly dominated by a matching in V and V is externally stable. 
matching outside of V blocking pairs to be matched resulting matching in V
µ4 {2, 3} µ2
µ5 {2, 3}, {5, 6} µ2
µ6 {1, 3} µ3
µ7 {1, 3}, {4, 6} µ3
µ8 {1, 2} µ1
µ9 {1, 2}, {4, 5} µ1
Table 3: Example 2 – blocking pairs on an indirect dominance path into V
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown a strong relation between stable matchings of a roommate
market, i.e., matchings that are not myopically blocked by a pair of agents, and singleton
vNM farsightedly stable sets: a singleton set is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only
if its element is stable (Theorem 1). Thus, a matching is myopically stable if and only if
it farsightedly (indirectly) dominates any other matching. Hence, for roommate markets,
the myopic notion of (pairwise) stability also induces farsighted stability. For the subclass
of marriage markets, according to Mauleon et al. (2008, Theorems 2), also the converse
is true: the only vNM farsightedly stable sets are singleton sets with stable matchings.
We ﬁnd that results for roommate markets can diﬀer in two fundamental ways from
those for marriage markets. First, for roommate markets it is possible that a vNM far-
sightedly stable set exists while no “myopic prediction” can be made (Example 2 describes
a roommate market with no stable matchings, but with a non-empty vNM farsightedly
stable set). Second, while the existence of stable matchings for marriage markets also
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guarantees a “farsighted prediction,” for roommate markets it is possible that no vNM
farsightedly stable set exists (Example 1). Hence, for an unsolvable roommate market
there never exists a singleton vNM farsightedly stable set while a non-singleton vNM
farsightedly stable set may or may not exist. For solvable roommate markets, at least
one singleton vNM farsightedly stable set always exists and it is easy to construct solv-
able roommate markets (e.g., marriage markets) without non-singleton vNM farsightedly
stable sets. Whether there exists a solvable roommate market with a non-singleton vNM
farsightedly stable set, however, is currently an open question.
A Appendix
Lemma 5. Three element vNM farsightedly stable sets do not exist for mar-
riage markets For any vNM farsightedly stable set V of a marriage market, |V | = 3.
Proof. Let V be a non-singleton vNM farsightedly stable set and consider a graph with
the set of vertices V and directed edges {i,j} where µ1 {i,j} µ2 indicates that {i, j} is
a blocking pair for µ1 that is matched under µ2. Note that the graph has no loops, i.e.,
there is no edge from a matching µ1 ∈ V to itself. By Lemma 3, there exists at least one
edge from any matching in V to any other matching in V .
Let µ1, µ2 ∈ V , µ1 = µ2. Consider any {i, j} with µ1 {i,j} µ2. Let µ1 →{i,j} µ˜1,
i.e., µ˜1 is the matching that results from µ1 by matching {i, j}. By internal stability of
V , µ˜1 /∈ V . By external stability of V , there exists a matching µ′1 ∈ V with µ′1  µ˜1.
By Lemma 2, µ1 ∈ I(R). So, by deﬁnition of µ˜1 and {i, j}, µ˜1 ∈ I(R). Note also that
µ′1 ∈ I(R). Hence, by Proposition 1, there is no blocking pair for µ′1 that is matched
under µ˜1. In particular, µ
′
1 = µ1. By Lemma 3, however, there is a blocking pair {i′1, j′1}
for µ′1 that is matched under µ1. Since µ1 →{i,j} µ˜1, the only agents who have diﬀerent
mates under µ1 and µ˜1 are i, j, µ1(i), and µ1(j). Then, the only two possibilities of
blocking pairs for µ′1 that are matched under µ1 but not matched under µ˜1 are {i, µ1(i)}
and {j, µ1(j)}. Let w.l.o.g. {i, µ1(i)} be a blocking pair for µ′1 that is matched under µ1
but not matched under µ˜1. Hence, µ
′
1 {i,µ1(i)} µ1 {i,j} µ2.
Suppose V = {µ1, µ2, µ3}. As there are no loops, µ′1 = µ1. Suppose that µ′1 = µ2.
Then, µ2 = µ
′
1 {i,µ1(i)} µ1 implies that i strictly prefers µ1(i) to µ2(i) = j. However,
since µ1 {i,j} µ2, agent i strictly prefers j to µ1(i). This contradiction, together with
µ′1 ∈ V , shows that µ′1 = µ3.
Let µ3 →{i,µ1(i)} µ˜3. By internal stability of V , µ˜3 /∈ V . By external stability of V ,
there exists a matching µ′3 ∈ V with µ′3  µ˜3. By Lemma 2, µ3 ∈ I(R). So, by deﬁnition
of µ˜3 and {i, µ1(i)}, µ˜3 ∈ I(R). Note also that µ′3 ∈ I(R). Hence, by Proposition 1,
there is no blocking pair for µ′3 that is matched under µ˜3. In particular, µ
′
3 = µ3. By
Lemma 3, however, there is a blocking pair {i′3, j′3} for µ′3 that is matched under µ3. Since
µ3 →{i,µ1(i)} µ˜3, the only agents who have diﬀerent mates under µ3 and µ˜3 are i, µ1(i),
µ3(i), and µ3(µ1(i)). The only two possibilities of blocking pairs for µ
′
3 that are matched
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under µ3 but not matched under µ˜3 are {i, µ3(i)} and {µ1(i), µ3(µ1(i))}. So, µ′3 {i′3,j′3} µ3
for (i′3, j
′
3) = (i, µ3(i)) or (i
′
3, j
′
3) = (µ3(µ1(i)), µ1(i)).
As there are no loops, µ′3 = µ3. Suppose that µ′3 = µ1. Then, µ1 = µ′3 {i′3,j′3}
µ3 implies that i
′
3 strictly prefers µ3 to µ1. However, since µ3 {i,µ1(i)} µ1, agent i
′
3
strictly prefers µ1 to µ3. This contradiction, together with µ
′
3 ∈ V , shows that µ′3 = µ2.
Summarizing, µ2 {i′3,j′3} µ3 {i,µ1(i)} µ1 {i,j} µ2.
Suppose (i′3, j
′
3) = (i, µ3(i)). Then, µ2Piµ1Piµ3Piµ2, which contradicts the transitivity
of Pi. Hence, assume that (i
′
3, j
′
3) = (µ3(µ1(i)), µ1(i)). If µ3(µ1(i)) = i, then again
µ2 Pi µ1 Pi µ3 Pi µ2. So, i
′
3 = µ3(µ1(i)) = i. Moreover, j′3 = µ1(i) = µ2(i) = j. Note that
by Lemma 2, all matchings in V are individually rational. Hence, {i, µ1(i)}, {i, j}, and
{i′3, j′3} are blocking pairs of cardinality 2. Suppose w.l.o.g. that agent i is a man, i.e.,
i ∈ M . Then, agents j and µ1(i) are women, i.e., j, µ1(i) ∈ W . Since j′3 = µ1(i) ∈ W ,
µ3(µ1(i)) = i
′
3 ∈ M . Hence, i and i′3 belong to another market side than j and j′3. Since
i = i′3 and j = j′3, {i, j} ∩ {i′3, j′3} = ∅.8
Let {k, l} be such that µ3 {k,l} µ2. Since µ3 ∈ I(R), {k, l} is a blocking pair of
cardinality 2. Suppose w.l.o.g. that k ∈ M . Then, i, k ∈ M and j, l ∈ W .
Case I: Suppose {k, l}∩{i, j} = ∅. Hence, since µ2(k) = l and µ2(i) = j, k = i and l = j.
Thus, {i, j} is a blocking pair for µ1 and µ3 that is matched under µ2. Let µ2 →{i′3,j′3} µ˜2.
By internal stability of V , µ˜2 /∈ V . Note that all matchings in V have a blocking pair
that is matched under µ˜2 ({i, j} or {i′3, j′3}). Hence, by µ˜2 ∈ I(R) and Proposition 1,
there exists no µ ∈ V with µ  µ˜2, which is in contradiction to the assumption that
V = {µ1, µ2, µ3} is a vNM farsightedly stable set. Hence, {k, l} ∩ {i, j} = ∅.
Case II: Suppose k = i′3. Then, µ2 {k,j′3} µ3 {k,l} µ2. Hence, µ2 Pk µ3 Pk µ2, which
contradicts the transitivity of Pk.
Case III: Suppose l = j′3. Then, µ2 {i′3,l} µ3 {k,l} µ2. Hence, µ2 Pl µ3 Pl µ2, which
contradicts the transitivity of Pl.
Case IV: Since i′3, k ∈ M and j′3, l ∈ W , this remaining case covers {i′3, j′3} ∩ {k, l} = ∅.
Let µ2 →{i′3,j′3} µ˜2. By internal stability of V , µ˜2 /∈ V . Note that all matchings in V have
a blocking pair that is matched under µ˜2 ({i, j}, {k, l}, or {i′3, j′3}). Hence, by µ˜2 ∈ I(R)
and Proposition 1, there exists no µ ∈ V with µ  µ˜2, which is in contradiction to the
assumption that V = {µ1, µ2, µ3} is a vNM farsightedly stable set.
8This does not necessarily hold for a roommate market since in that case i = j′3 or j = i
′
3 cannot be
excluded.
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